As members of academic societies and acting in accordance with a professional-ethical code, psychologists are required to realise principal ethical values connected with their profession, which include dignity, subjectivity and autonomy of a human being. Moreover, in relations with representatives of different fields of knowledge, psychologists attempt to promulgate such types of relations, based on the aforementioned values. The recent development of the media has provided many psychologists with a unique chance to popularise psychological knowledge. Nevertheless, while spreading it, every (...) psychologist is obligated to check if the content of presented facts is in accordance with contemporary science, taking into consideration not only the differences between hypotheses, but also substantiated claims. Special attention is paid by every psychologist to a careful present a tion of the facts which are at variance with the common psychologi cal knowledge or are susceptible to various interpretations. Therefore, practical capabilities of the modern psychology are pr e sented by psychologists in an honest way. Psychologists disseminate knowledge through a variety of media. Their main focus is on writing sc i- entific and popular scientific articles, but sometimes also psychological articles for advice sections or ps y- chological columns of the daily press. What is more, the r a dio, the television and the Internet provide a great possibility of populari sing psychology. Neverth e less, it should be emphasized that there are a lot of dangers of moral nature, hidden behind almost unlimited possibilities offered by the above - mentioned inn o- vations. Hence, there appears a demand for an ethical refle c tion on the risks of the media involvement. (shrink)

In this paper we give additional arguments in favor of the point of view that the violation of Bell, CHSH and CH inequalities is not due to a mysterious non locality of nature. We concentrate on an intimate relation between a protocol of a random experiment and a probabilistic model which is used to describe it. We discuss in a simple way differences between attributive joint probability distributions and generalized joint probability distributions of outcomes from distant experiments which depend on (...) how the pairing of these outcomes is defined. We analyze in detail experimental protocols implied by local realistic and stochastic hidden variable models and show that they are incompatible with the protocols used in spin polarization correlation experiments. We discuss also the meaning of “free will”, differences between quantum and classical filters, contextuality of Kolmogorov models, contextuality of quantum theory and show how this contextuality has to be taken into account in probabilistic models trying to explain in an intuitive way the predictions of QT. The long range imperfect correlations between the clicks of distant detectors can be explained by partially preserved correlations between the signals created by a source. These correlations can only be preserved if the clicks are produced in a local and deterministic way depending on intrinsic parameters describing signals and measuring devices in the moment of the measurement. If an act of a measurement was irreducibly random they would be destroyed. It seems to indicate that QT may be in fact emerging from some underlying more detailed theory of physical phenomena. If this was a case then there is a chance to find in time series of experimental data some fine structures not predicted by QT. This would be a major discovery because it would not only prove that QT does not provide a complete description of individual physical systems but it would prove that it is not predictably complete. (shrink)

The aim of the paper is to discuss the main characteristics exhibited by so-called rigid designators. Identification of proper names and some descriptions with rigidly designating expressions almost became a truism in the philosophy of language. It is argued that proper names are rigid designators because their reference is conventional, direct and nondescriptive but descriptions are such in spite of their reference being descriptive and mediated. Certain kinds of rigid designators and rigid reference are discriminated and it is found that (...) unlike rigidly designating descriptions most of proper names must be tied to the idea of transworld reference in order to be rigid. The conclusion is that rigidly designating descriptions must be metaphysically loaded much more than proper names for the former presuppose a kind of essentialism. (shrink)

The historical theory is one of the most successful and elaborated theories dealing with the referential behaviour of proper names. The aim of the article is mainly a negative one. The introduction presents a general point of view concerning proper names and their place within a language. The second and the third parts are devoted to an outline of a version of the historical theory; the main stress is placed on the well-known devices of the theory, i.e. the naming-relation and (...) the communication chain of name uses. The fourth part contains several critical remarks concerning both of the devices: it is pointed out that the naming-relation is unable to explain the reference of proper names and that the idea of communication chain is vague and cannot serve to its proper aims. (shrink)

As to the preference which most people—as long as they are not annoyed by instances—feel in favor of true propositions, this must be based, apparently, upon an ultimate ethical proposition: ‘It is good to believe true propositions, and bad to believe false ones’. This proposition, it is to be hoped, is true; but if it is not, there is no reason to think that we do ill in believing it. Bertrand Russell, “Meinong’s Theory of Complexes and Assumptions” (1904).

Clinical ethicists tend to see themselves as moral experts to be called in when clinicians encounter a particularly difficult moral problem. Drawing on a naturalized moral epistemology, we argue that clinicians already have the moral knowledge they need—the norms and values that guide clinical practice are built right into the various health care professions. To reflect on their practice, clinicians need to (a) be aware of their own professional norms and values; (b) be able to express them to their colleagues, (...) their patients, and the patients' families; and (c) work together with these other actors to provide ethically responsible care. The ethicist's job is to use her own training in three kinds of philosophical reflection as the basis for teaching clinicians how to think about what they do. (shrink)

Schmitt allots a chapter to each of the main types of theories about truth: pragmatism, coherentism, deflationism, and the correspondence theory. He discusses various arguments for these positions and concludes that only the arguments supporting the correspondence theory are successful. Schmitt's positive case for correspondence makes up the least original part of the book. He explicitly credits Field and remarks that he is mainly concerned with making Field's difficult account more accessible —a task that he discharges honorably..) Schmitt also offers (...) detailed discussions of about fifteen negative arguments aimed against pragmatism, coherentism, and deflationism. He finds most of them effective, with the result that the correspondence theory emerges as the only tenable account of truth. He discusses some objections but seems somewhat less eager to raise problems for his own view than for its competitors. (shrink)

Critical comments on Guido Melchior’s book, Knowing and Checking: An Epistemological Investigation (2019). In the second part of his book, Melchior aims to employ his sensitivity account of the epistemic concept of checking to explain well-known puzzle cases about knowing. My comments focus on Melchior’s explanation of knowledge-closure puzzles, as exemplified by Dretske’s zebra case. I raise three critical points about the explanation Melchior proposes for puzzles of this type.

In some recent articles, Jaegwon Kim has argued that non-reductive physicalism is a myth: when it comes to the mind-body problem, the only serious options are reductionism, eliminativism, and dualism.[1] And when it comes to reductionism, Kim is inclined to regard a functionalist theory of the mind as the best available option—mostly because it offers the best explanation of mind-body supervenience. In this paper, I will discuss Kim’s views about functionalism. They may be contended on two general grounds. First, some (...) functionalists will object to being classified as reductionists. Second, Kim argues for a version (or a reading) of functionalism, conceptualized functionalism, that makes it rather similar to the “old” mind-body identity theory it was designed to replace. Moreover, Kim’s conceptualized functionalism turns out to be a somewhat surprising brand of reductionism—a reductionism with some eliminativist cut-outs and, possibly, some dualist leftovers. At the end of the paper I propose a construal of the more standard version of functionalism that obviates Kim’s argument for switching-over to his conceptualized version. (shrink)

The T-biconditionals, also known as T-sentences or T-equivalences, play a very prominent role in contemporary work on truth. It is widely held that they are so central to our understanding of truth that conformance with them is indispensable to any account of truth that aspires to be adequate. Even “deflationists” and “inflationists” tend to agree on this point; their debate turns largely on just how central a role these biconditionals can play in a theory of truth. In the present paper, (...) I want to bracket this debate about their “theoretical role” and focus on the T- biconditionals themselves. They are typically presented as entirely unproblematic, as models of simplicity, clarity, and obviousness. I confess that I find them rather more puzzling than that. The main purpose of the paper is to reflect on some of these biconditionals and to survey and explore some doubts one might have about their virtues. (shrink)

The paper offers some preliminary and rather unsystematic reflections about the question: Do Beliefs Have Their Contents Essentially? The question looks like it ought to be important, yet it is rarely discussed. Maybe that’s because content essentialism, i.e., the view that beliefs do have their contents essentially, is simply too obviously and trivially true to deserve much discussion. I sketch a common-sense argument that might be taken to show that content essentialism is indeed utterly obvious and/or trivial. Somewhat against this, (...) I then point out that a “sexy” conclusion that is sometimes drawn from Putnam-Burge-style externalist arguments, namely that our mental states are not in our heads, presupposes content essentialism — which suggests that the view is not entirely trivial. Moreover, it seems intuitively that physicalists should reject the view: If beliefs are physical states, how could they have their propositional contents essentially? I distinguish three readings of the title question. Content essentialism does seem fairly obvious on the first two, but not so on the third. I argue that the common-sense argument mentioned earlier presupposes one of the first two readings but fails to apply to the third, on which ‘belief’ refers to belief-state tokens. That’s because ordinary belief individuation is silent about belief-state tokens. Token physicalists, I suggest, should indeed reject content essentialism about belief-state tokens. What about token dualists? One might think they ought to embrace content essentialism about belief-state tokens. I end with puzzling why this should be so. (shrink)

This book is an extensive review & analysis of Aristotelian thought as received & adapted by such medieval commentators as Ammonius, Philoponus, Boethius, al-Farabi, Yahya ibn 'Adi, Avicenna, Albertus Magnus, Thomas Aquinas, Martin of Dacia, Simon of Faversham, John Duns Scotus, Peter of Spain, Robert Kilwardby, William of Ockham, & Giles of Rome. The discussions range from metaphysics to logic, linguistics, & epistemology, encompassing such topics as being, god, causation, actuality, potentiality, universals, individuation, signification, cognition, certainty, infallibility, error, ignorance, analogy, (...) grammar, interpretation, foundationalism, & the eucharist & transubstantiation. (shrink)

An exploration of the legacy of Michael Servetus to the development of a new type of theological inquiry which ultimately helped lead to the development of critical biblical studies.

According to metaphysical realism, we would have to compare our thought with mind-independent reality, if we want to gain knowledge about the world. Such a comparison is impossible. Yet we can gain knowledge about the world. So metaphysical realism is false. — I take this to be the historically most influential argumentative line opposing metaphysical realism. The paper develops this argument, the Main Anti-Realist Argument, in more detail and offers a brief critical discussion of its crucial assumptions.

There lies at the basis of Leont’ev’s conception a clear distinction and fundamental division of two primary dimensions and rhythms of reality: history and eschatology. In the light of this Leont’evian perspective Dostoevskij’s conception was interpreted and critically evaluated through the prism of the absence in it, and the lack of awareness of the consequence thereof, of a similar, fundamental distinction. The centrality of Dostoevskij in the Russian and intellectual cultural tradition is, among other things, tied to his acceptance of (...) a series of fundamental and constitutive assumptions deeply rooted in a characteristic sphere of myths and illusions. The specificity of the place and significance of Leont’ev’s concepts within this tradition results from the fact that it takes a critical distance, giving thus the possibility of conceiving an essentially different problematization of the world extending beyond commonly established and naturalized obviousness of the principles and ‘prejudices’ of one’s own culture. (shrink)

Es gibt zwei Schlüsselfragen in der Theorie der Erkenntnis: ''Was wissen wir?" und "Wie wissen wir?". Chisholm hat argumentiert, daß uns der Versuch, diese Fragen zu beantworten, in eines der wichtigsten und schwierigsten philosophischen Probleme führt: in das Problem des Kriteriums. In dieser Arbeit wird in erster Linie die dem Common Sense verpflichtete Position des "Partikularismus" betrachtet, die von Chisholm als Lösung des Problems des Kriteriums vorgeschlagen wurde. Dabei wird der Frage nachgegangen, worin genau die partikularistische Lösung besteht, wie sich (...) der Partikularismus gegen skeptische Angriffe verteidigen kann, und worin er sich von seinem Konkurrenten, dem ''Methodismus" unterscheidet. (shrink)

Meinong-Studies, Vol. 6, contains papers focusing on the connections between intentionality and nonexistent objects, presenting historical analyses on the background of Meinong’s philosophical position up to the Meinong-Russell-Debate. It also contains systematic studies of fictional characters, of Kripke’s alternative theory of fiction, and of the relevance of fictions playing the role of assumptions in scientific contexts. The volume is completed by biographical sketches of Christian von Ehrenfels, founder of Gestalt-theory and Meinong’s close friend, and of Ernst Mally, disciple of Meinong (...) and successor to his chair. (shrink)

The paper explores Lehrer's notions of trustworthiness and acceptance and the interplay between them; it adopts a historical approach, looking at how Lehrer's views on these topics have evolved over the years.

Brentano's famous thesis of the Intentionality of the Mental was already formulated by Thomas Reid who used it in his campaign against the Locke-Berkeley-Hume Theory of Ideas. Apphed to the case of conceiving the thesis says that to conceive is to conceive something. This principle stands in apparent conflict with the common-sensical view, defended by Reid, that we can conceive what does not exist. Both principles, it is argued, are plausible and should be retained. The problem is how to resolve (...) the apparent contradiction. Reid's way out of the dilemma is clarified by contrasting it with less satisfactory solutions. (shrink)

Our tmst in our own trustworthiness as evaluators of tmth plays a uniquely important role in Lehrer's recent work in epistemology. Lehrer has claimed that a person who trusts in her own trustworthiness has a reason for accepting everything she accepts, including that she is trustworthy. This claim is too bold, trust in our trustworthiness cannot play the epistemic role Lehrer assigns to it. Neither does a suitably revised version of the claim succeed in assigning any important epistemic role to (...) our own trustworthiness as evaluators of truth. (shrink)

Die Frage nach der Existenz von Propositionen, aufgefaßt als abstrakte und allgemeine Gegenstände, ist einer der Zankäpfel des Universalienstreites in seiner heutigen Form. Da der Verfasser in diesem Streit auf der Seite jener steht, die, wie Piaton sagt, "alles aus dem Himmel und dem Unsichtbaren auf die Erde herabziehen", werden einige Überlegungen angestellt, die darauf abzielen, platonistische Argumente zu unterminieren, welche häufig im Rahmen einer realistischen Bedeutungstheorie sowie im Rahmen der Theorie von der Intentionalität des Mentalen vorgebracht werden, um uns (...) von der Notwendigkeit der Annahme von Propositionen zu überzeugen. (shrink)

Environmental economics is a policy science. Environmental economists, however, find that their policy recommendations are often neglected by political officials. Some of them react to this neglect by reproaching public authorities with lack of efficiency: this so-called inefficiency is considered to be a manifestation of government failure. Others propose a redefinition of environmental economics in order to make it fit better with actual political objectives. After briefly outlining the case for an economic paradigm that differs from conventional environmental economics, I (...) argue that an alternative paradigm demands a different interpretation of economic ‘objectivity’. I claim that economic ‘objectivity’ ultimately comes down to a non-neutral common consent within a particular community of economic scientists. This interpretation leaves room for a multiplicity of 'objective', but non-neutral economic theories. The fact that the inevitable value ideas underlying a particular theory cannot be made fully transparent, urges us to accept a different conception of the theory's political relevance. Environmental economic theory should be considered not so much a provider of political 'instruments', as of scientific 'insights'. It should not simply be considered a theory that responds to actual political objectives, but one that inspires political objectives. These two latter suggestions of mine are only preliminary recommendations, which require further conceptual analysis. (shrink)

For Polish Jews, Warsaw was an important center of social and cultural life. It was the biggest center of Jewish community and culture in Europe. It was also here that the greatest tragedy of this community took place, made still more dramatic by the transports of the Jews from various European and Polish cities. The Warsaw Ghetto Uprising reminds us of the egoism of the societies of the Allied powers. Similarly the lonely fight of the heroes of the Warsaw ghetto (...) reminds us of the lonely fight of the insurgents of Warsaw in 1944. Both uprisings involved the whole society. They differed only in the scale of military operations conducted and in their duration.Polish Jews, as well as the Jews from other countries, observed with deep interest the course of insurgent fights, in which a small number of Warsaw Jews saved from extermination and Jews from many European countries, liberated by the insurgents, took part. The feeling of community of fate of the Polish and Jewish nations was a phenomenon of the Warsaw Uprising in 1944; it was a harmony that was never achieved again. Jews, citizens of different countries and members of different organizations loudly demanded help for the heroic but forlorn insurgents. (shrink)

This paper is a short introduction to Habermas’s life and philosophy. It outlines his views on society, religion, morality and politics. It begins with his ‘methodological pragmatism’ which emphasizes the performative and intersubjective role of language. This rejects the “philosophy of consciousness” and sees society as a medium in which we live. Society is not an aggregate of individuals or a unity but a complex, multifarious, intersubjective structure with many different overlapping spheres. Habermas is essentially a social scientist and his (...) concern about society refers to the problem of how a social order and integrity can be maintained in a modern democratic and secular society. He believes that religion will survive a long time and is unsure whether philosophy will ever triumph over religion but is convinced that it can deal with our religious heritage with more sensitivity than hitherto. Habermas proposes a moral discourse theory based on the universalizability of social norms. In his political system, he combines the ideal of liberal democracy based on human rights with the ideal of republicanism based on popular sovereignty. He is nevertheless critical of some aspects of liberalism. Overall, Habermas foresees the danger to modern society to social groups that feel themselves to be alienated and marginalized from the mainstream. (shrink)

Derrida's first book-length work, _The Problem of Genesis in Husserl's Philosophy_, was originally written as a dissertation for his _diplôme d'études supérieures_ in 1953 and 1954. Surveying Husserl's major works on phenomenology, Derrida reveals what he sees as an internal tension in Husserl's central notion of genesis, and gives us our first glimpse into the concerns and frustrations that would later lead Derrida to abandon phenomenology and develop his now famous method of deconstruction. For Derrida, the problem of genesis in (...) Husserl's philosophy is that both temporality and meaning must be generated by prior acts of the transcendental subject, but transcendental subjectivity must itself be constituted by an act of genesis. Hence, the notion of genesis in the phenomenological sense underlies both temporality and atemporality, history and philosophy, resulting in a tension that Derrida sees as ultimately unresolvable yet central to the practice of phenomenology. Ten years later, Derrida moved away from phenomenology entirely, arguing in his introduction to Husserl's posthumously published _Origin of Geometry_ and his own _Speech and Phenomena_ that the phenomenological project has neither resolved this tension nor expressly worked with it. _The Problem of Genesis_ complements these other works, showing the development of Derrida's approach to phenomenology as well as documenting the state of phenomenological thought in France during a particularly fertile period, when Levinas, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, Ricoeur, and Tran-Duc-Thao, as well as Derrida, were all working through it. But the book is most important in allowing us to follow Derrida's own development as a philosopher by tracing the roots of his later work in deconstruction to these early critical reflections on Husserl's phenomenology. "A dissertation is not merely a prerequisite for an academic job. It may set the stage for a scholar's life project. So, the doctoral dissertations of Max Weber and Jacques Derrida, never before available in English, may be of more than passing interest. In June, the University of Chicago Press will publish Mr. Derrida's dissertation, _The Problem of Genesis in Husserl's Philosophy_, which the French philosopher wrote in 1953-54 as a doctoral student, and which did not appear in French until 1990. From the start, Mr Derrida displayed his inventive linguistic style and flouting of convention."—Danny Postel, _Chronicle of Higher Education _. (shrink)

In this paper we propose a conceptualization of ‘posthumous social status’ as a performative reality accomplished through collective actions that are materially and symbolically legitimated. We question the classical definitions of social status that lead to oversocialized theoretical models, and we argue for the necessity to reconsider the relation between social status and social roles in order to gain insight into the reality of a social presence after death. On this account, we claim that the prestige attached to one's position (...) in society is a social phenomenon produced through autopoietic systems of social influence rather than a pre-existent and stable feature embedded in hierarchical structures and actions. Therefore, we clarify the link between social status and systems of influence through a case study in which we discuss how the Christian-Orthodox tradition is socially organized as a powerful realm of doing posthumous social status. (shrink)